Product and tech

A skimmer in checkout: what an attack on a Brazilian platform teaches about e-commerce security

A padlock on a space background, titled Checkout is the last place to open the door

On October 26, 2026, Sansec, a security company focused on e-commerce, published research on an attack against Brazilian stores. A Magecart group, active since 2024, placed a card skimmer inside the analytics script of a Brazilian e-commerce company, a platform used by dozens of fashion brands in the country.

From October 24, anyone completing a purchase on those checkouts unknowingly sent the card number, expiry date, CVV, cardholder name, and CPF to an attacker-controlled server. On October 27, the platform said it had removed the malicious code and fixed the server, and Sansec confirmed the script was clean.

The case is serious. The more important lesson is about architecture.

How the attack worked

The target was not the checkout itself. It was an analytics script running inside it.

The platform used its own installation of Plausible, an open source analytics tool. According to Sansec, the installed version had not been updated and had a critical flaw patched months earlier, the likely entry point, still unconfirmed. The attacker changed a single file: the tracking script that every checkout on the platform loaded.

Because the script ran on the same page as the payment form, it could see everything the customer typed. The malicious code activated only at the payment step, read the card fields, and sent the data out. One compromised file was enough to hit every store on the platform at the same time.

This is called a supply chain attack. Instead of breaking into stores one by one, the attacker breaks into a supplier that sits inside all of them. According to the research, the same group had already attacked stores on Magento, OpenCart, and WooCommerce, almost all of them in Brazil.

Why the CPF makes it worse

A leaked card can be blocked and replaced. A CPF cannot. In Brazil, banks and services use the CPF to identify a person, and together with the card data it widens the fraud risk well beyond that purchase.

For the merchant, the loss does not end at the chargeback. What remains is the distrust of people who bought, the strain with the payment provider, and the work of explaining what happened.

The lesson: fewer parties inside checkout

Every script that runs in checkout is a door. Analytics, a media pixel, chat, an A/B test: each one is third-party code, hosted by someone else, that has to be updated and watched. One of them compromised is enough to expose the payment form.

That is exactly why Shopify treats checkout as a closed area.

  • Checkout belongs to Shopify. It is hosted and operated by Shopify itself, which is PCI DSS Level 1 certified, the highest requirement for anyone processing cards.
  • Card data stays isolated. Payment fields are served by Shopify in an environment separate from the page. Neither the store theme nor installed apps can read what the customer types there.
  • Loose script does not get in. Shopify ended checkout customization through free-form code and now requires Checkout Extensibility. Extensions and tracking pixels run in an isolated environment, without direct access to the page or to the payment fields.
  • There is no parallel checkout. Shopify does not let a store replace its checkout with a third-party checkout. External payment methods come in as approved gateways, inside Shopify’s flow.
  • Updates do not depend on the store. The attack likely used a flaw that already had a fix for months. On Shopify, checkout infrastructure is maintained and patched by Shopify itself, with no self-hosted server waiting on an update.

For people used to changing everything, these rules can look like a limitation. Cases like this show why they exist. When checkout does not accept just any code, the chance of a compromised script reaching the customer’s card drops sharply.

What is worth reviewing in your store

No platform removes the need for care. A few questions that apply to any operation:

  • Which third-party scripts run on your store’s pages today, and who updates each one?
  • Is any of them hosted on your own server, with no update routine?
  • Are media and analytics pixels configured through the platform’s native tools, or injected as loose code?
  • Would you notice quickly if one of those files changed?

If you paid by card at a Brazilian store since October 24, Sansec’s research, listed in the sources below, shows how to identify the affected checkouts. In that case, the recommendation is to ask the bank to block and replace the card, and to watch for fraud involving your CPF.

Security is also a platform choice

At DISCO, security is part of the project from the design onward. On Shopify, that starts with a closed checkout and continues with tracking done through native tools, with no loose script running where the customer types the card.

If you want to review the security of your operation, or move to a platform that treats checkout with that rigor, talk to DISCO.